An Account of M, As Told in 1980-1981 to John Matthew Rubens, San Diego, California, Re:

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–Islamic Fatherhood Revisited

Compilation Copyright ‘M’, John Rubens (July 07, 1980; 1981, online 2014; Titles by John Matthew Rubens);

Formerly entitled, The Iranian Revolution: Iran’s Struggle with a New Father, Copyright M, as told to and edited by John Rubens (1980, 1981) Title by M.

We will begin by recalling some of the major political events that took place prior to the insurgent Iranian Revolution of 1978. The popular government of the Iranian People in 1953 was led by a man named Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. His administration’s policy was directed toward supporting the masses of Iran, commonly referred to as a “Populist“. However, the populist stance of the Iranian leader became increasingly unpopular in the eyes of Mossadeq’s opposition: the huge oil companies of the West. To upbraid the troublesome politician, a coup was organized to topple the Mossadeq government.

The United States supported the coup because a new leader would allow them greater voice in Iranian foreign policy and greater control of their vast oil assets under the jurisdiction of Iran. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, hereinafter referred to as “Shah” or “the Shah” was re-installed as the leader of this “renewal” of relations between Iran and the “West”. The coup d’etat was spear-headed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, hereinafter referred to as “CIA” or “the CIA” in conjunction with an angry Iranian mob (sound familiar?). The CIA paid commissions to the instigators of a riot in the streets of Tehran who used taunts, degrading the name of Mossadeq, and giving praises to the Shah. The mob was successful in kidnapping Dr. Mossadeq during the demonstration, a pre-requisite to the toppling of his democratically-elected Office and the collapse of his Administration. The ensuing result of the coup was the return of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from his hiding place in Italy to the Imperial Throne of Iran.

The Problem’s Inception

The Mossadeq government gave people a sense of freedom and liberty that they had been denied for many years under previous leaders of Iran. The Mossadeq Administration was modeled after North American and West European democratized nation-states. Citizens were allowed certain inalienable rights that allowed them to think and act on their own initiative and to speak out for what they believed in. These freedoms were upheld as rights protected the Iranian Constitution in force during his Administration which ended in 1953.

The Communist (Toudeh) Party

The numerous political parties which existed in Iran during Mossadeq’s rule were not interfered with or suppressed by his Administration. This laissez-faire attitude of democratic government created an opportunity for the Communist Party, hereinafter referred to as the Toudeh Party, to gain a powerful foothold as members of the Constitutional Government of Iran. The CIA as one might expect, did not like Mossadeq’s tolerance of Toudeh Party members who distributed pro-Soviet propaganda with bravado aimed primarily against the United States. The literature lambasted American foreign policy and the “imperialistic” motivation of its vital interests not only in the Middle East, but throughout the developing world. The populace was paying attention.

The Toudeh Party continued to gain popularity under Mossadeq until the United States took action to counteract their propaganda drive. The US plan for dissolution of Toudeh was two-fold: 1) to diminish Soviet influence in Iran and 2) once Soviet influence had waned, the United States would be able to regain access to Iranian oilfields without public unrest [the West was shut out of the Iranian oil industry at the time by the Mossadeq Administration].

Many Iranians were very sensitive to oil-interested politics in the early 1950’s. Between 1951 and 1953 for instance, oil production in Iran was at a standstill because the service contracts between Great Britain and Iran to extract and distribute the petroleum were seen by most Iranians as unconscionable. For instance, it was widely publicized that the British only paid royalties of 16% of the profits it made on Iranian Oil and that American interests were driving inflation higher.

In response to Iran’s oil embargo of the early 1950’s, Great Britain gave the Mossadeq Administration an ultimatum: either relent and end the embargo or suffer naval occupation of the Persian Gulf (with the invariable implications of a “blockade”). The Iranian populace responded tout suite: oil businessmen and technicians that had been exploiting Iran’s natural petroleum resources since the turn of the 20^th Century were expelled. After the mass expulsion of the Western oil interests, Mossadeq set out to nationalize oil.

Once the oil sector in Iran had stabilized, foreigners could come to work in Iran, but solely for the nationalized program, not for oil companies under British jurisdiction. [ Compare, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’ attempts to nationalize oil in his country during the Administration of George W. Bush in the United States 2007-2008]. Subsequently, British worker’s, primarily engineers, did not like working for the Iranian oil company and came disgruntled. Persuaded by the British government, they abandoned their positions in the Iranian petroleum industry and left the country. Iranian engineers and technicians did not have the expertise to run the petroleum industry in their country without outside help and the industry fell into disarray. If that was not enough, no one was buying Iranian oil due to political pressure from Great Britain. Furthermore, England made a spectacle of the breach of their contract with Iran, and took them to the International Court in The Hague, Netherlands. It was perceived by this author that the British relied too much on their outspoken political persuasiveness and economic clout than burgeoning international law courts at The Hague. As it was, the International Court ruled in favor of the Iranian Government. The ruling was based on the fact that Britain began exploiting Iran’s petroleum resources under alleged contracts that were not produced at trial by the British, and the Iranians allegedly did not have copies. The Court went on to point out that Iran was currently a sovereign nation and no longer a colony of the British Empire. As such, a sovereign nation not only has the right of self-determination, but the means to ensure that right. The decision of the Court was that Iran had the sole right to all mineral resources located beneath the ground of its territories. [The wording of the World Court’s precepts have certainly evolved since the early 1950’s, as has the Court(s) corporate structure, membership and jurisdiction]. Although the Iranian government asked for restitution, it could not prove theft of its sovereign natural resources over the preceding sixty years. Neither Iran nor Great Britain produced copies or originals of any “agreements” the two sovereigns may have been working under since Iran separated from the British Empire in the late 19^th Century, so the international judicial forum did not retroactively nullify the contracts but did nullify any supposed “agreements” either of the two countries may have thought they were working under going forward.

As Great Britain Recedes from the Iranian Oil Picture in the mid-1950’s, U.S. Oil Companies Step Up Their Efforts to Negotiate With Iran and Win Contracts in Petroleum Interests

[See also: Accounts by Principal for Occidental Petroleum from Wikipedia: Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) is a California-based oil and gas exploration and production company with operations in the United States, the Middle East, North Africa, and South America. Its headquarters is in Westwood, Los Angeles California^[4][5] but the company has announced it will move to Houston in 2014 or 2015.^{[6] online 2014]}

Achilles Heel

Initially, the U.S. Oil Companies supported the Mossadeq regime. Former President Harry S. Truman was sent as an Ambassador to Iran to discuss possible oil trade with Mossadeq in 1953. Then President Eisenhower knew it was important to send a diplomat of high regard to meet with the Iranian Prime Minister in order to show the enthusiasm the United States had to do business with them.

Mossadeq wanted to aggravate America, but continue to export oil. At the same time, England urged their allies in Europe and the Americas not to buy oil from Iran in order to suffocate their economy. Iran suffered severely from the embargo. They were not receiving income from oil as almost all of their production was barely enough to support their domestic consumption. This inability to produce a surplus of oil production for export was a main reason Iran continued to experience rising inflation and a huge trade deficit.

The Toudeh Party relished the fact that Mossadeq was in a bind, after all, they wanted to rule Iran in his place. On the issue of oil exports, the Toudeh Party actively opposed Mossadeq’s suspension of oil exports to the West and provoked a public outcry. Soon, Mossadeq’s adoring public was demonstrating in the streets of Tehran. Now Mossadeq needed money more that the “West” needed oil (the Korean War was winding down as well). Mossadeq, determined to sell more oil to American oil companies, set about to quell Toudeh inspired rumors and retain his composure, after all, the plurality of Iranians still admired his steadfast political objectivity, his honesty and manner.

The United States and Great Britain had and continue to have radically intertwined economies, and therefore, both countries had and continue to have almost identically vital interests in Iran. Mossadeq “blinked”. He was forced to sell oil to American companies because some of his major domestic political antagonists were impatient with the rising inflation and lack of revenue from oil, Iran’s primary natural resource. If that was not enough, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as USSR) did not approve of the Mossadeq regime. Along with the US and Great Britain, they devised a plan to boycott Iranian oil even if it was offered to them for sale. The three-way solidarity was enough to ensure an economic depression in Iran at the time.

The Toudeh Party stepped up their efforts and began ad hominem misinformation campaigns against Prime Minister Mossadeq, including rumors he was a “puppet of America”. Like bees buzzing around his head, Mossadeq’s adversaries began to overwhelm him. Divisive domestic and “Western” interests allied against him crippling Iran’s economy. Inflation, along with the civil unrest that followed as a response to it, became Mossadeq’s Achilles heel.

At some point about this time while Mossadeq was still in office and the embargo ongoing, an Italian ship loaded with Iranian oil was seized by the British Navy in the Indian Ocean. As political tensions between England and Iran heightened to a crescendo, the United States, for its part, sought new methods of gaining access to Iranian Oil. Allies from the Second World War, the USSR and Great Britain, were still close enough to take a +step together with the United States on Iran: coordinate a coup d’etat.

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi sent a declaration to Prime Minister Mossadeq informing him he was deposed of his authority and that General Zahedi would assume the Office of Prime Minister. Mossadeq would have none of it. He had just won at the World Court in The Hague. He had some clout left, at least internationally. He could appeal to the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as UN). He was right. The Shah’s Plan A backfired and he was forced to leave the country, first to Iraq, and later to Italy in fear for his life.

Within three days the Shah and his close associates arranged Plan B: a plot to overthrow the Mossedeq Prime Ministership. The Shah’s flight to Italy provided a diversion for General Zahedi, who was also in hiding, to arrange the coup against the INF, Mossadeq’s political party. Mossadeq continued to maintain if not enjoy a large following in Iran and for this reason, the Shah and his associates were afraid of the people’s reaction to the coup. The main and most vocal opponent of what became known as “General Zahedi’s plot” was the Toudeh Party, which had been growing progressively stronger under Mossadeq’s Administration. All three of the major interested parties in “General Zahedi’s plot”, the United States, Great Britain and the then Soviet Socialist Soviet Republic (hereinafter referred to as USSR) agreed not to interfere with the coup or stage a meddling counter-coup once the takeover of the Iranian government was completed by Zahedi.

Up until 1953, of the major world powers, England had the most influence over Iran and its affairs. As the year passed, American diplomacy and persuasiveness won out as did General Zahedi in the coup. The United States had two basic interests in Iran. The first and foremost concern was the dissolution of the Toudeh Party and its entrenched propaganda machine. Once dissolution was accomplished or nearly certain to be accomplished, the United States wanted simply to get Iranian oil into American oil tankers. To achieve these two objectives quickly, strategically and efficiently, the US decided it would re-introduce the Shah as the dictator of Iran.

THE COUP’ETAT: 1953
    

A rabble of pro-Shah demonstrators, led by twenty-one military officers, staged the coup which was organized by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. Some of the twenty-one officers overseeing and/or carrying out the rebellion were enemies of Mossedeq and in Iranian prison(s) at the time. The coup was successful, Mossadeq was thrown in prison, and the officers that helped orchestrate the coup were freed.

The Toudeh Party told its members and officers that a new government must be formed as soon as possible so that General Zahedi would not have time to consolidate his power in a military dictatorship. As far as the communists were concerned, anarchy and revolution were preferable to having all the authority with Zahedi, or anyone else. The Toudeh Party had a plan of their own and it did not include the Shah, Dr. Mossadeq or General Zahedi. The communists would “fatigue the new government”, then at an opportune moment, stage another uprising. Thus, the Toudeh Party did not cross their compatriots in the USSR at the outset, although they were allied with “the West”. They planned to allow the CIA devised coup to go forward and gain control of the Iranian Government at a later date. The Toudeh Party wanted to install a leader who they could manipulate and use to gain access to enable their own ends in Iranian politics. In 1978, The Ayatollah Khomeini was to become this individual.

Around the same period, a network of communist military officers were discovered accidentally by General Zahedi’s government. A specific officer was apprehended carrying a suitcase with the names of 1200 people that had infiltrated the Iranian military service. Six hundred of the names found were part of a conspiracy of anti-shah military officers ranging from lieutenant to colonel (hereinafter Sr. Officers). The names of the other six hundred soldiers (hereinafter Jr. Officers)were written down in a complicated code. A Major in the Zahedi armed forces, distinguished as an expert code breaker, was called in to decipher the names of the Jr. Officers found in the briefcase. Unknowingly, Zahedi had “hired” a communist infiltrator who took the codes of the 600 Junior Officers and fled the country, never to be found again. Fear and intrigue prevailed in the wake of the disclosures of the Iranian Major who left the service of the country. Since the identities of the 600 Jr. Officers remained unknown, the secret police and informants were looking to reveal their identities. Communist influence seemed to pervade daily life, but such was the case in the United States (1953 and in the USSR as well (compare McCarthyism; Stalin’s Purges).

The Reza Shah Pahlavi’s personal guard was not without its defectors [At an earlier time than 1953, Shah Pahlavi found a derogatory letter one morning at his bedside when he awoke. It shook his confidence immensely and it was apparent to the Iranian public for some time]. Due to the present [1953] circumstances and the prior letter of warning, Pahlavi was suspicious of his allies, even his closest friends. Il etait raison (Fr.). What was not as apparent perhaps, was Zehedi’s transfer of power to the Shah.

The Shah Takes Over the Helm of a Persian Ship

Along with the six hundred Sr. Officers that were arrested by General Zahedi’s forces, the Iranian government arrested several communist politicians. Of these, forty were executed and the others imprisoned. The strong military response of the Shah and Zahedi frightened the Iranian population. The aggression was seen as a totalitarianistic gambit and short term (martial law) strategy, and unlike before, there were no protests over the government consolidative action. It was under these coercive circumstances that the Iranian Oil pact(s) with Western European powers and American oil companies was ratified by the Iranian parliament. It was decided that eight major concessionaires from different countries should undertake the production and sale of Iranian oil. Mossadeq’s government, and his goals for Iran were over. A new regime had begun to greet the populace with different goals and different ideals to focus upon—and it pleased the Shah’s Western benefactors.

Major Petroleum Concessionaires from the United States

The major concessionaires of Iran’s oil resources were based and/or headquartered in the United States and paid taxes to the United States. General Zahedi made a deal with the US oil companies and was awarded a fee of 60-70 million dollars to use as he pleased. In the new Iran-US Oil contract, 51% of the oil profits belonged to Iran, while 49% belonged to the oil companies that owned the concession: that meant they were the principal that was responsible for exploration, feasibility studies, production, sales, distribution including associated storage and transport of the petroleum product(s).

USSR Bears Gift

In the 1950’s, the USSR wanted the ouster of General Zahedi at any cost. In an act of goodwill, the Soviets returned eleven tons of gold it had acquired from Iran during World War II. Although former Prime Minister Mossedeq had demanded return of the gold previously of the Soviets during his administration, the Soviets did not oblige him with the transfer. Now, the circumstances and geo-political climate had changed and the Soviets hoped that the “gift” would help ease relations between the two countries. Iran had enough oil for export to make this initial gold “investment in the future” worthwhile.

Iran was enthusiastic about the gold returned by the Soviets to sovereign soil, however, trade relations between the two countries remained muted. With British and American concessions paying top dollar, the Soviets could not compete and took a “backseat” to their former WWII allies in Iran oil exports. However, the USSR made it clear they would not interfere with the West’s arrangement with Iran only if assurances were promised that first advantage or first look would be given to the USSR in other domains and endeavors in the future, whatever they may be (e.g. wheat from the US, most favored nation status, or future oil contracts). A “divide and conquer” strategy was replaced by one of bargain and compromise—the “cold war”. The understanding was “We’ll let you have your way this time but you better make sure we get ours “next” time or were taking it.”

BARGAINING WITH THE BIG GUYS

Negotiations with the Middle East in the early 1950’s became the precedent for a new type of agreement between the superpowers of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain with respect to Iran. The USSR conceded to Zahedi’s policy in order to focus its attention in other areas of the world, such as Korea. The USSR felt that the North Korean government, an assured acquisition of theirs, could do their bidding for them against South Korea, without getting their own hands “soiled” in war. Once the Soviet’s found a sympathetic group to do their bidding for them, there was no reason why they should not aid their comrades and overcome their enemies.

In Iran, the situation was not as clear-cut. Those that opposed a communist state outnumbered those who wanted one; at least that was the pluralistic sentiment. But like a boat in rough water, Iranians were unsure what other residents favored in public policy or governmental structure(s). What the plurality did agree on was they wanted change. Change was the only “mantra” anyone had any assurance in.

As a result of the foregoing, the Soviets did not interfere with Iranian trade during the early 1950’s or threaten it with coercive tactics that would “rock the boat” now being led by the “West”. No, the USSR was determined to “wait it out” for the appointed time when they could tell the US or the UK, “Our turn now, move over!”

SHAH PAHLAVI AND THE FOUNDATION OF HIS SECRET POLICE FORCE #SAVAK

In 1958, the CIA established a secret police force (secret service) for the Shah of Iran called the Organization of Information and Security of Iran (translated and hereinafter referred to as SAVAK). SAVAK was established to maintain order and keep the power in the hands of its ruler, Shah Pahlavi. SAVAK used totalitarian techniques and used totalitarian methods to achieve political stability. This Unit would be known to capture and detain anyone who opposed the State or who displayed dissatisfaction with the new regime.

There were several groups of individuals (probably some individuals were in more than one group?) who opposed the Shah. The different types of organizations, or “groups” were: 1) the Iranian National Front, or INF of which Dr. Mossedeq was a party member and was imprisoned when the Shah seized power successfully after the recent coup, 2) the communist party, aka the Toudeh Party and 3) Clerics (i.e. the Ayatollahs). The Shah used his secret police force SAVAK to suppress all these “groups” from interfering with affairs of State in Iran.

PRESIDENT JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY’S INFLUENCE IN IRAN (circa 1960-1963)

During John F. Kennedy’s term of office (1960-1963) a wave of political “coup d’etats” swept the third world (hereinafter referred to as the “developing world”). Political unrest prevailed in many parts of Latin America and South-East Asia. The reasons for the unrest were a general dissatisfaction with their respective governments and the widespread desire to establish a “better society” even if by means of violent upheaval(s). Kennedy’s method of restraining communist governments from taking over smaller, underdeveloped countries was to influence the presiding government to respect human rights. Kennedy’s diplomacy acted as a deterrent to anarchy and revolution in Iran because it gave the Shah limitations in the way he ran the country. Kennedy’s theory was that if the people were content with their government and their leaders, they would have no imminent reason to break with the status quo and revolt.

Kennedy was the significant factor which led to many reforms in Iran under the Shah’s administration. He advised the Shah in the early ’60’s to moderate the use of his power keeping in mind his duty to serve his constituents. In other countries, where the close monitoring of its national rulers was not as comprehensively studied as it had been in Iran after the second World War, communist governments assumed power primarily due to the society’s discontent with their leaders. Kennedy stressed the development of a policy for human rights that would appease the public and decrease the chance of a revolution from ever occurring. The Kennedy Administration recommended Dr. Amini, Secretary of the Financial Ministry in Zahedi’s Cabinet to be appointed the new Prime Minister. Amini was very close to the Kennedy family and had represented Iran in the recent oil pact with Western concessionaires. The Western nations of the US, UK, France and Germany seemed to agree on Amini as Prime Minister as they found him to be an able negotiator. Amini was ultimately appointed through Kennedy’s influence and the Shah made special efforts to tolerate his rival’s presence; they were not the best of friends. Since Amini had been installed at the urging of John Kennedy, he had a special distinction in Parliament that none of the other members had. Amini was relatively independent from the Shah’s jurisdiction and had the right to express his personal views at Parliamentary sessions even if they were incongruous to the Shah’s.

REFORMATION

The Shah and Amini worked together to reform the Iranian Constitution. The work product of their tenuous political alliance was called the Six Principles of the Shah’s Revolution. These principles were as follows:

• All large land owners transfer some of their land to the peasants who had worked it as lessees. Up until the reform, landlords would rent out their acreage to peasants much like European feudal lords had done with serfs in the Middle Ages. Now peasants could be farmers, ranchers or entrepreneurs with a chance to make a living for themselves and enjoy the windfall of fruits from their labor and management.
  
• Young, educated people were sent to villages to teach the peasants how to read and write. The young adults also familiarized the country-dwellers with recent technological advances in health, medicine and agriculture.
  
• Medical school graduates must spend at least two years serving the village poor in Iran without a salary prior to entering the greater medical profession (in lieu of mandatory military service).
  
• Nationalization of Iranian forests, which had been owned by private landlords before the reform.
  
• Bestow women with rights equal to those of men
  
• Establish new election regulations.
  

Two of the six points infuriated the clergymen. They didn’t like the transfer of land to the peasants or making women’s rights equal to those of men. The transfer of land to the peasants meant they would have to rely more on almsgiving from them rather than solely from the wealthy landowners. Prior to the reforms, clerics received an allowance from the rich landlords. After the reforms, they were at the mercy of the almsgiving of the peasants who were now endowed with the means to give back to the clerics what was once given to them directly from the wealthy. The clergymen’s “job” prior to the reforms had been to quell dissent among the poor so they would cause landlords a minimal amount of “trouble”. Clerics did not believe women should be granted equal rights to men but rather, subject themselves to the dictates of men. Accordingly, Ayatollah Khomeini accused the Shah of formulating the Six Principles due solely to American and Zionist influence. The Shah had the power to silence Khomeini and other clerics by imprisonment, so most of the Islamic priests obeyed the Shah, however reluctantly.

THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE SHIET SECT OF ISLAM

Both sects of lslam, Shiet and Sunni, co-exist in Iran, though the Shiet sect is much more prevalent in the country as a whole. In fact, Iran is the hub of the Shiet sect. Khomeini was among the Shiets since birth, and had been recognized as a Great Ayatollah at the suggestion of Shariatmadari [Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari (Azerbaijani: Məhəmməd Kazım Şəriətmədari, Persian: محمد
کاظم
شریعتمداری‎), also spelled Shariat-Madari (1905 – 3 April 1986 ), was an Iranian
Grand Ayatollah (from Wikipedia online 05-02-2014)]. The Shiets have a ceremonial rite in memory of Imam Hossein, the nephew of Mohammad the prophet, founder of Islam in the seventh century a.d. In 1963, during the ceremonial day of Hagation, an anti-Shah demonstration was held in Tehran, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The demonstrators shouted derogatory remarks and slogans against the Shah until the Shah ordered his guards to open fire into the assembly. Approximately one hundred people were killed in the shooting that afternoon, although Khomeini went on record accusing the Shah of executing 15,000 people.

The Ayatollah Khomeini’s claim that 15,000 people had been summarily executed by the Shah’s guard backfired. There exists an allegory known to Iranians which the Shah used to persuade his people he was “right” and Khomeini was obviously “wrong”: Once there was a very powerful king who conquered India named Nader Shah. One day, he became very angry with one of his subjects and ordered he be given 1,000 lashes and thrown into the dungeon. The condemned man was giddy with laughter when he heard the sentence.

“Why are you laughing?” asked the king.

“Your highness” replied the sentenced subject, “either you have not had the experience of being whipped or you cannot count. If one is to endure 1,000 lashes, he certainly will not live to see his prison cell!”

The allegory was thus used to parody Khomeini’s penchant for exaggeration. A videotape of the incident clearly shows no more than 100 could have perished. Khomeini either “cannot count”, or he makes use of puffery and chicanery to prove his points of moral superiority. Since it had to be assumed the Ayatollah Khomeini learned to add long ago, the Shah’s regime persuaded the people that it was Khomeini, and not himself, who used exaggeration to shuffle the facts and hide the truth from the people.

Similar events led by the clerics beholden to Khomeini occurred elsewhere in Iran, but most people accepted the Six Principles because they freed them from the domination of the landlords. Khomeini had misread the sympathies of the majority of Iranians and his reputation was tarnished. Soon after the Hagation uprising and subsequent smaller demonstrations throughout Iran, the Shah sought punishment for Ayatollah Khomeini. The Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari was instrumental in saving Khomeini from execution as well as affording him exile in neighboring Iraq. The general population revered Ayatollah Khomeini as a figurehead of Shiet Islam and would have objected to any violent means of punishment. In a corner and wanting to wash his hands of the violent governmental responses to the Hagation and “after-shock” demonstrations, the Shah settled on the solution of exile as it would at least diminish his influence within Iran.

AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Some months after these demonstrations, on November 22, 1963, U.S. President John F. Kennedy was assassinated during a campaign trip to Dallas, Texas. After Kennedy’s death, the Shah removed Dr. Amini from office because of the absence of political pressure from the Kennedy Administration. The Shah had been afraid of Amini because of his power as a mouthpiece of scrutiny and a threat to his unquestioning control. The Shah chose a relatively inexperienced man named Amir Asadollah Allam to succeed Amini as Prime Minister. Allam was essentially another one of the Shah’s “yes-men.” Allam’s ignorance allowed the Shah to manipulate him as well as giving an impression to the populace that he was coordinating the power of government constitutionally between himself and the Prime Minister. In actuality however, the Shah had become the virtual dictator of Iran.

Inflation characterized the term of Allam’s office, and after a few years, on March 7, 1964, Mansour, a more knowledgeable politician, became the new Prime Minister. Mansour was supported by the American government and raised the price of domestically purchased oil in order to sell large quantities at discount prices to the Western oil companies abroad. During his term in office, he raised the price of petroleum twice. The people of Iran were furious with Mansour’s actions, especially since they were still coping with the inflation brought about by Allam’s so-called “slipshod” Administration. What infuriated the public even more was that although the international spot price of oil remained relatively constant, Iranian domestic oil prices continued to increase under the Mansour Administration.

The stage was slowly being set for revolution. Public sentiment was growing increasingly negative toward the Shah’s regime and they were speaking out and sharing their negativity with neighbors and colleagues. The end of inflation and “hard times” seemed nowhere in sight and the populace found itself of the brink. Tension over the situation was causing fissures in the ancient civilization of Iran (see Persia on Wikipedia).

THE SIX PRINCIPLES: THEORY VS. PRACTICE

The “Six Principles” of the Shah were not upheld because the governmental officials did not enforce them as the populace began to believe the Shah had deceived them. The land that the peasants received from the landowners was rapidly being sold off to pay the loans they took out to begin farming the land (sound familiar?). During the first year of the cooperative effort, the government stopped funding the peasants and they had no chance of paying back their loans unless they were extremely fortunate with their first harvest. Without a ‘bumper crop’ and/or favorable commodities prices at which they could liquidate their agricultural products, the lack of government funding follow-through forced many to migrate to the cities where they could find jobs to support themselves and their families.

HOVEIDA AS PRIME MINISTER

Mansour was assassinated by a secret organization belonging to the clerics in February, 1964 and Hoveida, who was the Financial Minister in Mansour’s administration, became the new Prime Minister in January of 1965 and served in that position until his arrest following the Iranian Revolution of 1978 and ultimate execution on April 7, 1979. Hoveida’s first decision in office was to decrease the price of oil to domestic buyers. This was significant in that it was perceived by the public as a goodwill gesture and eased public relations between them and the Iranian government.

Hoveida’s political platform seemed honest on open to them. He criticized the way the previous government had handled its administration, and even accepted the shortcomings of his own role as financial minister in the Mansour Administration. He announced a new governmental policy was being formulated and his constituency was eager to believe his optimistic outlook for Iran was sincere. Hoveida’s dreams of effortless prosperity were short-lived however, and in 1963, he taxed the wealthy heavily for the property they already owned and luxury items they bought. During the next 14 years, Hoveida imposed 250 different kinds of taxes in addition to those the citizens were already paying. For example, if an individual, group or family wanted to travel outside of Iran by air, the principal traveler had to pay a two hundred dollar travel tax in addition to the respective airfare charge(s). Subsequently, a one hundred and fifty dollar surcharge was imposed and collected for each additional passenger on the flight as well. This policy, as could be expected, infuriated the rich, but appeased the poor whom the Shah was most anxious to please—they rarely if ever flew.

GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF IMPORTED AND EXPORTED ITEMS

All important imports and exports were governmentally controlled under Hoveida’s Prime Ministry. The most important commodities traded in Iran were grain, sugar, oil and industrially manufactured items. The services the government controlled were the railroads, postal service and airlines. Managers of the various smaller divisions of commerce were bribed on a regular basis while others simply embezzled surplus money using accounting principles and methodologies enabling them to “skim off the top” of the accounts without anyone being the wiser (See also #slushfunds). The government was unable to supervise all the subsidiary commerce division heads and graft soon became prevalent. Division managers enriched themselves often without being called to account for their actions to the public’s detriment.

For example, if an individual asked for permission to build a house, the housing office might say, “No, not unless you pay me this extra fee (as a bribe). During the rampant corruption of the division managers, one “minister” was found to have embezzled four million U.S. Dollars from an undisclosed sugar contract. When questioned by reporters about the embezzlement, Prime Minister Hoveida said that governmental officials “deserved” the added monetary job perks due to the important vital nature of the work they accomplished for the Iranian people.

IRAN AS A MEMBER OF OIL PRODUCING EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

In an act of goodwill toward his people, the Shah had dissolved the foreign concessionaires in Iran and nationalized oil resources circa 1963. The oil companies could sell and distribute the oil, but the petroleum products themselves were declared a public trust by him.
The result of the Shah’s nationalization of Iran’s oil meant both increased revenues and greater political leverage within the OPEC cartel, of which they had by this time become members.

THE SHAH’S DOMESTIC POLICIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS COMPARED

International investor was the Shah, and he placed large sums of money in foreign sources to assure him of assets were he to be thrown out of his home country as he had been in the early 1950’s during his confrontation with Dr. Mossadeq.
The Shah bought shares of foreign stock. Among his holdings was a 25% ownership in a German-based corporation named CROUP, and a relatively large position in Pan-American Airways. The Shah also built oil refineries in Africa, India, Pakistan and gave financial aid to the United Arab Republic, Great Britain, Pakistan and several African countries. In 1976, the economy of Great Britain was sagging and in dire need of economic stimulation. The Shah’s immediate investment and the currency float between Iran and the U.K. spelled increased British employment and a shot in the arm economically.

The domestic policy of the Shah was far different than his open-handed foreign policy. In the scholastic year of 1973-1974, the Shah allotted $1,500,000.00 per day to feed all students under sixteen years old, and gave $100.00 per month to each university student. In the elementary and high school programs for students under sixteen, the money for the food was sent in large quantities to the several different supervisors in the various districts of Iran. The supervisors in charge of distributing the lunch money for each child often found ways to withhold some of the money earmarked for the students. The district supervisors allowed skimpier lunches as time progressed and in doing so, were able to divert the more and more surplus money to themselves as an unsanctioned “reward” for their thrift and ingenuity. Sadly, the “unused” portion of the lunch money often surpassed the amount used to buy the student lunches and feed the children.

[May 5, 2014: CincoDeMayoLosAngeles: Correction: Supreme Leader Khameini, President Hassan Rouhani. {Re: following tweet from Ayatollah Khamenei received by retweet (RT) via Margaret Brennan of #BloombergNews today: “Around 1979 during Friday prayers,I talked about Irish #freedom fighters & #BobbySands that a street in #Iran bears his name.” From Khamenei’s official #twitterpage: “Follow for regular updates and news about Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader.” Thank you for the corrections.}]

[O4-29-2014: Tweet received from President Hassan Rouhani : “Today, the world is witness to how we are engaging with the international community with a voice of reason. #ConstructiveEngagement.” #BacktotheFuture (1985) A Film by Robert Zemeckis; starring Christopher Lloyd and Michael J. Fox #UniversalPictures].

[The Iran–Contra affair [#IranContra] (Persian: ایران–کنترا‎, Spanish: caso Irán-Contra), also referred to as Irangate,^[1]
Contragate^[2] or the Iran–Contra scandal, was a political scandal in the United States that came to light in November 1986. During the Reagan administration, senior administration officials secretly facilitated the sale of arms to Iran, the subject of an arms embargo.^[3] Some U.S. officials also hoped that the arms sales would secure the release of several hostages and allow U.S. intelligence agencies to fund the Nicaraguan
Contras. Under the Boland Amendment, further funding of the Contras by the government had been prohibited by Congress.

The scandal began as an operation to free the seven American hostages being held in Lebanon by a group with Iranian ties connected to the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. It was planned that Israel would ship weapons to Iran, and then the United States would resupply Israel and receive the Israeli payment. The Iranian recipients promised to do everything in their power to achieve the release of the U.S. hostages. The plan deteriorated into an arms-for-hostages scheme, in which members of the executive branch sold weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of the American hostages.^[4][5] Large modifications to the plan were devised by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council in late 1985, in which a portion of the proceeds from the weapon sales was diverted to fund anti-Sandinista and anti-communist rebels, or Contras, in Nicaragua.^[6][7]

While President Ronald Reagan was a supporter of the Contra cause,^[8] the evidence is disputed as to whether he authorized the diversion of the money raised by the Iranian arms sales to the Contras.^[4][5][9] Handwritten notes taken by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on December 7, 1985, indicate that Reagan was aware of potential hostage transfers with Iran, as well as the sale of Hawk and TOW missiles to “moderate elements” within that country.^[10] Weinberger wrote that Reagan said “he could answer to charges of illegality but couldn’t answer to the charge that ‘big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free the hostages'”.^[10] After the weapon sales were revealed in November 1986, Reagan appeared on national television and stated that the weapons transfers had indeed occurred, but that the United States did not trade arms for hostages.^[11] The investigation was impeded when large volumes of documents relating to the scandal were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration officials.^[12] On March 4, 1987, Reagan returned to the airwaves in a nationally televised address, taking full responsibility for any actions that he was unaware of, and admitting that “what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages”.^[13]

Several investigations ensued, including those by the U.S. Congress and the three-person, Reagan-appointed Tower Commission. Neither found any evidence that President Reagan himself knew of the extent of the multiple programs.^[4][5][9] Ultimately the sale of weapons to Iran was not deemed a criminal offense but charges were brought against five individuals for their support of the Contras. Those charges, however, were later dropped because the administration refused to declassify certain documents. The indicted conspirators faced various lesser charges instead. In the end, fourteen administration officials were indicted, including then-Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger. Eleven convictions resulted, some of which were vacated on appeal.^[14] The rest of those indicted or convicted were all pardoned in the final days of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, who had been vice-president at the time of the affair.^[15]]

[“Iran-Contra Affair” and “Shariatmadari” courtesy of and special thanks to Wikipedia online 05-02-2014; Wikipedia Sources. See also Michael M. J. Fischer. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003.

Moojan Momen Shi’i Islam Yale University Press 1986

Shaul Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, ISBN 0-465-06887-1

Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran]

#ResearchPause

Dear Readers:

#AnAccountofM Iran 1953-1980 is at a pause for research of education financing and nutrition.

From California Dept of Education website: See Telephone # below for more information.

I googled: education finance and nutrition

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