From Twitter:

Khamenei.ir ‏@khamenei_ir
3m

Then the US president shamelessly says that: to prevent terrorism we cooperate with Israel!

 

 

@khamenei_ir Dear Ayatollah, why “shamelessly”?Are you suggesting it is a movement (discernment in Jesuit faith in Jesus) toward brutality?

Which terrorists?!The Palestinian who’s been driven out of his homeland?! No! The most wicked #terrorists of the world is fake Israeli govt.

 

@khamenei_ir Native americans driven out by settlers and immigrants who followed? Do you forgive us for a stained history in blood? #slavery

 

 

Compilation copyright Ayatollah Khamenei and John Rubens

May 14, 2014

 

 

 

An Account of M, As Told in 1980-1981 to: John Rubens, San Diego, California

 

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–Islamic Fatherhood Revisited

 

We begin by recalling some of the major political events that took place prior to the insurgent Iranian Revolution of 1978. The popular government of the Iranian People in 1953 was led by a man named Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. His administration’s policy was directed toward supporting the masses of Iran, commonly referred to as a “Populist“. However, the populist stance of the Iranian leader became increasingly unpopular in the eyes of Mossadeq’s opposition: the huge oil companies of the West. To upbraid the troublesome politician, a coup was organized to topple the Mossadeq government.

The United States supported the coup because a new leader would allow them greater voice in Iranian foreign policy and greater control of their vast oil assets under the jurisdiction of Iran. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, hereinafter referred to as “Shah” or “the Shah” was re-installed as the leader in the so-called “renewal of relations” between Iran and the “West” [For purposes of this book, the “West” refers primarily to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States, and secondarily western industrialized democracies (see
Wikipedia under the search “define: western industrialized democracies 20^th Century) .

Shah Out, Shah In, Shah Out Again

The 1953 coup d’etat was spear-headed by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, hereinafter referred to as “CIA” or “the CIA”, in conjunction with an angry Iranian mob. The CIA paid commissions to the instigators of a riot in the streets of Tehran who used taunts, degrading the name of Mossadeq, and giving praises to the Shah. The mob was successful in kidnapping Dr. Mossadeq during the demonstration, a pre-requisite to the toppling of his democratically-elected Office and the collapse of his Administration. The resultant coup was the return of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi from his hiding place in Italy to the Imperial Throne of Iran. The Shah is back in.

Let’s Flashback: The Problem’s Inception

The Mossadeq government gave people a sense of freedom and liberty that they had been denied for many years under previous leaders of Iran. The Mossadeq Administration was modeled after North American and West European democratized nation-states. Citizens were allowed certain inalienable rights that allowed them to think and act on their own initiative and to speak out for what they believed in. These freedoms were upheld as rights protected the Iranian Constitution in force during his Administration which ended in 1953.

The Communist Toudeh (a/k/a Tudeh) Party

The numerous political parties which existed in Iran during Mossadeq’s rule were not interfered with or suppressed by his Administration. This laissez-faire attitude of democratic government created an opportunity for the Communist Party, hereinafter referred to as the Toudeh Party, to gain a powerful foothold as members of the Constitutional Government of Iran. The CIA as one might expect, did not like Mossadeq’s tolerance of Toudeh Party members since they distributed pro-Soviet propaganda with bravado aimed primarily against the United States. The literature lambasted American foreign policy and the “imperialistic” motivation of its vital interests not only in the Middle East, but throughout the developing world. The populace was paying attention.

The Toudeh Party continued to gain popularity under Mossadeq until the United States took action to counteract their propaganda drive. The US plan for dissolution of Toudeh was two-fold: 1) to diminish Soviet influence in Iran and 2) once Soviet influence waned, the United States would be able to regain access to Iranian oilfields without public unrest [the West was shut out of the Iranian oil industry at the time by the Mossadeq Administration].

Many Iranians were very sensitive to oil-interested politics in the early 1950’s. Between 1951 and 1953 for instance, oil production in Iran was at a standstill because the service contracts between Great Britain and Iran to extract and distribute petroleum were seen by most Iranians as unconscionable. For instance, it was widely publicized that the British only paid royalties of 16% of the profits it made on Iranian Oil and that American interests were driving inflation higher.

In response to Iran’s oil embargo of the early 1950’s, Great Britain gave the Mossadeq Administration an ultimatum: either relent and end the embargo or suffer naval occupation of the Persian Gulf (with implications of a “blockade”). The Iranian populace responded tout de suite: oil businessmen and technicians that had been exploiting Iran’s natural petroleum resources since the turn of the 20^th Century were expelled. After the mass expulsion of the Western oil interests, Mossadeq set out to nationalize oil.

Once the oil sector in Iran had stabilized, foreigners could come to work in Iran, but solely for the nationalized program, not for oil companies under British jurisdiction. [Compare, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’ attempts to nationalize oil in his country during the Administration of George W. Bush in the United States 2007-2008]. Subsequently, British workers, primarily engineers, did not like working for the Iranian oil company and came disgruntled. Persuaded by the British government, they abandoned their positions in the Iranian petroleum industry and left the country. Iranian engineers and technicians did not have the expertise to run the petroleum industry in their country without outside help and the industry fell into disarray. If that was not enough, no one was buying Iranian oil due to political pressure from Great Britain. Furthermore, England made a spectacle of the breach of Iran’s “breach” of its contract with them and sued them in an International Court in The Hague, Netherlands. It was perceived by the author that the British relied too much on their outspoken political persuasiveness and economic clout than by contract law enforceable by the Court (according to the author, a United Nations (hereinafter U.N.) Court in those days) sat The Hague. As it was, the International Court ruled in favor of the Iranian Government. The ruling was based on the fact that Britain began exploiting Iran’s petroleum resources under alleged contracts that were not produced at trial by the British, and the Iranians allegedly did not have copies to enter into evidence either. The Court went on to point out that Iran was currently a sovereign nation and no longer a colony of the British Empire. As such, a sovereign nation not only has the right of self-determination, but the means to ensure that right. The decision of the Court was that Iran had the sole right to all mineral resources located beneath the ground of its territories. [The wording of the World (or as the author recounts, the U.N.) Court’s precepts have certainly evolved since the early 1950’s, as has the Court(s) corporate structure, membership and jurisdiction]. Although the Iranian government asked for restitution, it could not prove theft of its sovereign natural resources over the preceding sixty years and since neither Iran nor Great Britain produced copies or originals of any “agreements” the two sovereigns may have been working under since Iran separated from the British Empire in the late 19^th Century, the Court did not retroactively nullify the contracts but did nullify any supposed “agreements” either of the two countries may have thought they were working under going forward.

As Great Britain Recedes from the Iranian Oil Picture in the mid-1950’s, U.S. Oil Companies Step Up Their Efforts to Negotiate With Iran and Win Contracts in Petroleum Interests

Achilles Heel

Initially, U.S. Oil Companies supported the Mossadeq regime. Former President Harry S. Truman was sent as an Ambassador to Iran to discuss possible oil trade with Mossadeq in 1953. Then President Eisenhower knew it was important to send a diplomat of high regard to meet with the Iranian Prime Minister in order to show the enthusiasm the United States had to do business with them.

Mossadeq wanted to aggravate America, but at the same time continue to export oil to them. Meanwhile, England urged their allies in Europe and the Americas not to buy oil from Iran in order to suffocate their economy. Iran suffered severely from the embargo. They were not receiving income from oil as almost all of their production was barely enough to support their own domestic consumption. This inability to produce a surplus of oil production for export was a key cause of their rising inflation and huge trade deficit.

The Toudeh Party relished the fact that Mossadeq was in a bind, after all, they wanted to rule Iran in his place. On the issue of oil exports, the Toudeh Party actively opposed Mossadeq’s suspension of oil exports to the West and provoked a public outcry. Soon, Mossadeq’s adoring public was demonstrating in the streets of Tehran. In 1953 Iran, Mossadeq needed money more that the “West” needed oil (the Korean War was winding down as well). Mossadeq, determined to sell more oil to American oil companies, set about to quell Toudeh inspired rumors and retain his composure, after all, the plurality of Iranians still admired his steadfast political objectivity, honesty and manner.

The United States and Great Britain had and continue to have radically intertwined economies, and therefore, both countries had and continue to have almost identically vital interests in Iran. Mossadeq “blinked”. He was forced to sell oil to American companies because some of his major domestic political antagonists were impatient with the rising inflation and lack of revenue from oil, Iran’s primary natural resource. If that was not enough, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as USSR) did not approve of the Mossadeq regime. Along with the US and Great Britain, theformer WWII allies devised a plan to boycott Iranian oil even if it was offered to them for sale. The three-way solidarity was enough to ensure an economic depression in Iran at the time.

The Toudeh Party stepped up their efforts and began ad hominem misinformation campaigns against Prime Minister Mossadeq, including rumors he was a “puppet of America”. Like bees buzzing around his head, Mossadeq’s adversaries began to overwhelm him. Divisive domestic and Western factions attacked him for a crippled Iranian economy. Inflation, along with the civil unrest that followed as a result, was Mossadeq’s Achilles heel.

At some point about this time while Mossadeq was still in office and the embargo ongoing, an Italian ship loaded with Iranian oil was seized by the British Navy in the Indian Ocean. As political tensions between England and Iran heightened to a crescendo, the United States for its part sought new methods of gaining access to Iranian Oil. Heightened political tensions in Iran led the former WWII allies to coordinate a coup d’etat together.

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi

Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi sent a declaration to Prime Minister Mossadeq informing him he was deposed of his authority and that General Zahedi would assume the Office of Prime Minister. Mossadeq would have none of it. He had just won at the World Court in The Hague. He had some clout left, at least internationally. He could appeal to the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as UN). He was right. The Shah’s Plan A, the declaration, backfired and he was forced to leave the country, first to Iraq, and later to Italy in fear for his life.

Within three days the Shah and his close associates arranged Plan B: a plot to overthrow the Mossadeq Prime Ministership. The Shah’s flight to Italy provided a diversion for General Zahedi, who was also in hiding, to arrange the coup against the INF, Mossadeq’s political party. Mossadeq continued to maintain if not enjoy a large following in Iran and for this reason, the Shah and his associates were afraid of the people’s reaction to the coup. The principal and most vocal opponent of what became known as “General Zahedi’s plot” was the Toudeh Party, which had been growing progressively stronger under Mossadeq’s Administration. All three of the major interested parties in “General Zahedi’s plot”, the United States, Great Britain and the USSR, agreed not to interfere with the coup or stage a meddling counter-coup once the takeover of the Iranian government was completed by Zahedi.

Up until 1953, of the major world powers, England had the most influence over Iran and its affairs. As the year passed, American diplomacy and persuasiveness won out as did General Zahedi in the coup. The United States had two basic interests in Iran. The first and foremost concern was the dissolution of the Toudeh Party and its entrenched propaganda machine. Once dissolution was accomplished or nearly certain to be accomplished, the United States simply wanted to get Iranian oil into American oil tankers. To achieve these two objectives quickly, strategically and efficiently, the US decided it would be in its best interests to re-introduce the Shah as the dictator of Iran.

THE COUP’ETAT: 1953
    

A rabble of pro-Shah demonstrators, led by twenty-one military officers, staged the coup which was organized by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States. Some of the twenty-one officers overseeing and/or carrying out the rebellion were enemies of Mossadeq and in Iranian prison(s) at the time. The coup was successful, Mossadeq was thrown in prison, and the officers that helped orchestrate the coup were freed from Iranian incarceration.

The Toudeh Party told its members and officers that a new Iranian government must be formed as soon as possible so that General Zahedi would not have time to consolidate his power in a military dictatorship. As far as the communists were concerned, anarchy and revolution were preferable to having all the authority with Zahedi, or anyone else. The Toudeh Party had a plan of their own and it did not include the Shah, Dr. Mossadeq or General Zahedi. The communists would “fatigue the new government”, then at an opportune moment, stage another uprising. Thus, the Toudeh Party would not have to “double-cross” their compatriots in the USSR at the outset, although they were allied with “the West” during the coup. Rather, they planned to allow the CIA devised coup to go forward and seize control of the Iranian Government at a later date. Toudeh organizers wanted to install a leader who they could manipulate while consolidating their own party’s political power. In 1978, The Ayatollah Khomeini was to become this individual.

Around the same period, a network of communist military officers were discovered accidentally by General Zahedi’s government. A specific officer was apprehended carrying a suitcase with the names of 1200 people that had infiltrated the Iranian military service. Six hundred of the names found were part of a conspiracy of anti-Shah military officers ranging from lieutenant to colonel (hereinafter Sr. Officers). The names of the other six hundred soldiers (hereinafter Jr. Officers) were written down in a complicated code. A major in the Zahedi armed forces, distinguished as an expert code breaker, was called in to decipher the names of the Jr. Officers found in the briefcase. Unknowingly, Zahedi had “hired” a communist infiltrator who took the codes of the 600 Junior Officers and fled the country, never to be found again. Fear and intrigue prevailed in the wake of the disclosures of the Iranian Major who left the service of the country. Since the identities of the 600 Jr. Officers remained unknown, the secret police and informants were investigating the case to uncover their identities. Communist influence seemed to pervade daily life, but such was the case in the United States and in the USSR as well in 1953(compare McCarthyism; Remnants of Stalin Purges, daughter’s defection).

The Reza Shah Pahlavi’s personal guard was not without its defectors [At an earlier time than 1953, Shah Pahlavi found a derogatory letter one morning at his bedside when he awoke. It shook his confidence immensely to the point it was visibly apparent to the Iranian public for some time]. Due to the present [1953] circumstances and the prior letter of warning, Pahlavi was suspicious of his allies, even his closest friends. Il etait raison (Fr.). What was not as apparent perhaps, was Zahedi’s transfer of power to the Shah.

The Shah Takes Over the Helm of a Persian Ship

Along with the six hundred Sr. Officers that were arrested by General Zahedi’s forces, the Iranian government arrested several communist politicians. Of these, forty were executed and the others imprisoned. The strong military response of the Shah and Zahedi frightened the Iranian population. The aggression was seen as a totalitarianistic gambit and short term (martial law) strategy, and unlike before, there were no protests over the government consolidative action. It was under these coercive circumstances that the Iranian Oil pact(s) with Western European powers and American oil companies was ratified by the Iranian parliament. It was decided that eight major concessionaires from different countries should undertake the production and sale of Iranian oil. Mossadeq’s government, and his goals for Iran were over. A new regime had begun to greet the populace with different goals and different ideals to focus upon—and it pleased the Shah’s Western benefactors.

 

Major Petroleum Concessionaires from the United States

The major concessionaires of Iran’s oil resources were based and/or headquartered in the United States and paid taxes to the United States. General Zahedi made a deal with the US oil companies and was awarded a fee of 60-70 million dollars to use as he pleased. In the new Iran-US Oil contract, 51% of the oil profits belonged to Iran, while 49% belonged to the oil companies that owned the concession: that meant they were the principal that was responsible for exploration, feasibility studies, production, sales, distribution including associated storage and transport of the petroleum product(s).

USSR Bears Gift

In the 1950’s, the USSR wanted the ouster of General Zahedi at any cost [don’t know why]. In an act of goodwill, the Soviets returned eleven tons of gold it had acquired from Iran during World War II. Although former Prime Minister Mossedeq had demanded return of the gold previously of the Soviets during his administration, the Soviets did not oblige him with the transfer. Now, the circumstances and geo-political climate had changed and the Soviets hoped that the “gift” would help ease relations between the two countries. Iran had enough oil for export to make this initial gold “investment in the future” worthwhile.

Iran was enthusiastic about the gold returned by the Soviets to sovereign soil, however, trade relations between the two countries remained muted. With British and American concessions paying top dollar, the Soviets could not compete and took a “backseat” to their former WWII allies in Iran oil exports. However, the USSR made it clear they would not interfere with the West’s arrangement with Iran only if assurances were promised that first advantage or first look would be given to the USSR in other domains and endeavors in the future, whatever they may be (e.g. wheat from the US, most favored nation status, or future oil contracts). A “divide and conquer” strategy was replaced by one of bargain and compromise—the “cold war”. The understanding was “We’ll let you have your way this time but you better make sure we get ours “next” time or were taking it.”

BARGAINING WITH THE BIG GUYS

Negotiations with the Middle East in the early 1950’s became the precedent for a new type of agreement between the superpowers of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain with respect to Iran. The USSR conceded to Zahedi’s policy in order to focus its attention in other areas of the world, such as Korea. The USSR felt that the North Korean government, an assured acquisition of theirs, could do their bidding for them against South Korea, without getting their own hands “soiled” in war. Once the Soviet’s found a sympathetic group to do their bidding for them, there was no reason why they should not aid their comrades and overcome their enemies.

In Iran, the situation was not as clear-cut. Those that opposed a communist state outnumbered those who wanted one; at least that was the pluralistic sentiment. But like a boat in rough water, Iranians were unsure what other residents favored in public policy or governmental structure(s). What the plurality did agree on was they wanted change. Change was the only “mantra” anyone had any assurance in.

As a result of the foregoing, the Soviets did not interfere with Iranian trade during the early 1950’s or threaten it with coercive tactics that would “rock the boat” now being led by the “West”. No, the USSR was determined to “wait it out” for the appointed time when they could tell the US or the UK, “Our turn now–move over!”

SHAH PAHLAVI AND THE FOUNDATION OF HIS SECRET POLICE FORCE #SAVOK

In 1958, the CIA established a secret police force (secret service) for the Shah of Iran called the Organization of Information and Security of Iran (translated and hereinafter referred to as SAVOK). SAVOK was established to maintain order and keep the power in the hands of its ruler, Shah Pahlavi. SAVOK used totalitarian techniques and used totalitarian methods to achieve political stability. This Unit would be known to capture and detain anyone who opposed the State or who displayed dissatisfaction with the new regime.

There were several groups of individuals (probably some individuals were in more than one group?) who opposed the Shah. The different types of organizations, or “groups” were: 1) the Iranian National Front, or INF of which Dr. Mossedeq was a party member and was imprisoned when the Shah seized power successfully after the recent coup, 2) the communist party, aka the Toudeh Party and 3) Clerics (i.e. the Ayatollahs). The Shah used his secret police force SAVOK to suppress all these “groups” from interfering with affairs of State in Iran.

PRESIDENT JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY’S INFLUENCE IN IRAN (circa 1960-1963)

During John F. Kennedy’s term of office (1960-1963) a wave of political “coup d’etats” swept the third world (hereinafter referred to as the “developing world”). Political unrest prevailed in many parts of Latin America and South-East Asia. The reasons for the unrest were a general dissatisfaction with their respective governments and the widespread desire to establish a “better society” even if by means of violent upheaval(s). Kennedy’s method of restraining communist governments from taking over smaller, underdeveloped countries was to influence the presiding government to respect human rights. Kennedy’s diplomacy acted as a deterrent to anarchy and revolution in Iran because it gave the Shah limitations in the way he ran the country. Kennedy’s theory was that if the people were content with their government and their leaders, they would have no imminent reason to break with the status quo and revolt.

Kennedy was the significant factor which led to many reforms in Iran under the Shah’s administration. He advised the Shah in the early ’60’s to moderate the use of his power keeping in mind his duty to serve his constituents. In other countries, where the close monitoring of its national rulers was not as comprehensively studied as it had been in Iran after the second World War, communist governments assumed power only after society’s became discontent with their leaders. Kennedy stressed the development of a policy for human rights that would appease the public and decrease the chance of a revolution from ever occurring. The Kennedy Administration recommended Dr. Amini, Secretary of the Financial Ministry in Zahedi’s Cabinet to be appointed the new Prime Minister. Amini was very close to the Kennedy family and had represented Iran in the recent oil pact with Western concessionaires. The Western nations of the US, UK, France and Germany seemed to agree on Amini as Prime Minister as they found him to be an able negotiator. Amini was ultimately appointed through Kennedy’s influence and the Shah made special efforts to tolerate his rival’s presence; they were not the best of friends. Since Amini had been installed at the urging of John Kennedy, he had a special distinction in Parliament that none of the other members had. Amini was relatively independent from the Shah’s jurisdiction and had the right to express his personal views at Parliamentary sessions even if they were incongruous to the Shah’s.

REFORMATION: THE SIX PRINCIPLES

The Shah and Amini worked together to reform the Iranian Constitution. The work product of their tenuous political alliance was called the Six Principles of the Shah’s Revolution. These principles were as follows:

• All large land owners transfer some of their land to the peasants who had worked it as lessees. Up until the reform, landlords would rent out their acreage to peasants much like European feudal lords had done with serfs in the Middle Ages. Now peasants could be farmers, ranchers or entrepreneurs with a chance to make a living for themselves and enjoy the windfall of fruits from their labor and management.
  
• Young, educated people were sent to villages to teach the peasants how to read and write. The young adults also familiarized the country-dwellers with recent technological advances in health, medicine and agriculture.
  
• Medical school graduates must spend at least two years serving the village poor in Iran without a salary prior to entering the greater medical profession (in lieu of mandatory military service).
  
• Nationalization of Iranian forests, which had been owned by private landlords before the reform.
  
• Bestow women with rights equal to those of men
  
• Establish new election regulations.
  

Two of the six points infuriated the clergymen. They didn’t like the transfer of land to the peasants or making women’s rights equal to those of men. The transfer of land to the peasants meant they would have to rely more on almsgiving from them rather than solely from the wealthy landowners. Prior to the reforms, clerics received an allowance from the rich landlords. After the reforms, they were at the mercy of the almsgiving of the peasants who were now endowed with the means to give back to the clerics what was once given to them directly from the wealthy. The clergymen’s “job” prior to the reforms had been to quell dissent among the poor so they would cause landlords a minimal amount of “trouble”. Clerics did not believe women should be granted equal rights to men but rather, subject themselves to the dictates of men. Accordingly, Ayatollah Khomeini accused the Shah of formulating the Six Principles due solely to American and Zionist influence. The Shah had the power to silence Khomeini and other clerics by imprisonment, so most of the Islamic priests obeyed the Shah, however reluctantly.

THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE SHIET SECT OF ISLAM

Both sects of lslam, Shiet and Sunni, co-exist in Iran, although the Shiet sect is much more prevalent within its borders. In fact, Iran is the hub of the Shiet sect. Khomeini was among the Shiets since birth, and had been recognized as a Great Ayatollah at the suggestion of Shariatmadari [Sayyid Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari (hereinafter referred to as Dari). Dari was of Azerbaijani descent [Məhəmməd Kazım Şəriətmədari, Persian: محمد
کاظم
شریعتمداری‎}, also spelled Shariat-Madari (1905 – 3 April 1986 )] and was an Iranian
Grand Ayatollah who recommended Khomeini become a Grand or “Great” Ayatollah during the reforms of the 1960’s-1970’s (from Wikipedia online in part 05-02-2014)]. The Shiets have a ceremonial rite in memory of Imam Hossein, the nephew of Mohammad the prophet, founder of Islam in the seventh century A.D. In 1963, during the ceremonial day of Hagation, an anti-Shah demonstration was held in Tehran, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The demonstrators shouted derogatory remarks and slogans against the Shah until the Shah ordered his guards to open fire into the assembly. Approximately one hundred people were killed in the shooting that afternoon, although Khomeini went on record accusing the Shah of executing 15,000 people.

The Ayatollah Khomeini’s claim that 15,000 people had been summarily executed by the Shah’s guard backfired. There exists an allegory known to Iranians which the Shah used to persuade his people he was “right” and Khomeini was obviously “wrong”: Once there was a very powerful king who conquered India named Nader Shah. One day, he became very angry with one of his subjects and ordered he be given 1,000 lashes and thrown into the dungeon. The condemned man was giddy with laughter when he heard the sentence.

“Why are you laughing?” asked the king.

“Your highness” replied the sentenced subject, “either you have not had the experience of being whipped or you cannot count. If one is to endure 1,000 lashes, he certainly will not live to see his prison cell!”

The allegory was thus used to parody Khomeini’s penchant for exaggeration. A videotape of the incident clearly shows no more than 100 could have perished. Khomeini either “cannot count”, or he makes use of puffery and chicanery to prove his points of moral superiority. Since it had to be assumed the Ayatollah Khomeini learned to add long ago, the Shah’s regime persuaded the people that it was Khomeini, and not himself, who used exaggeration to shuffle the facts and hide the truth from the people.

Similar events led by the clerics beholden to Khomeini occurred elsewhere in Iran, but most people accepted the Six Principles because this aspect of the Shah’s reform freed them from the domination of the landlords. Khomeini had misread the sympathies of the majority of Iranians and his reputation was tarnished. Soon after the Hagation uprising and subsequent smaller demonstrations throughout Iran, the Shah sought punishment for Ayatollah Khomeini. The Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari was instrumental in saving Khomeini from execution as well as affording him exile in neighboring Iraq. The general population revered Ayatollah Khomeini as a figurehead of Shiet Islam and would have objected to any violent means of punishment. In a corner and wanting to wash his hands of the violent governmental responses to the Hagation and “after-shock” demonstrations, the Shah settled on the solution of exile as it would at least diminish his influence within Iran. Khomeini was made a “Great Ayatollah by Dari in 1965.

AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Some months after these demonstrations, on November 22, 1963, U.S. President John F. Kennedy was assassinated during a campaign trip to Dallas, Texas. After Kennedy’s death, the Shah removed Dr. Amini from office because of the absence of political pressure from the Kennedy Administration. The Shah had been afraid of Amini because of his power as a mouthpiece of scrutiny and a threat to his unquestioning control. The Shah chose a relatively inexperienced man named Amir Asadollah Allam to succeed Amini as Prime Minister. Allam was essentially another one of the Shah’s “yes-men.” Allam’s ignorance allowed the Shah to manipulate him as well as giving an impression to the populace that he was coordinating the power of government constitutionally between himself and the Prime Minister. In actuality however, the Shah had become the virtual dictator of Iran in the wake of Kennedy’s death.

Inflation characterized the term of Allam’s office, and after a few months, on March 7, 1964, Mansour, a more knowledgeable politician, became the new Prime Minister. Mansour was supported by the American government and raised the price of domestically purchased oil in order to sell large quantities at discount prices to the Western oil companies abroad. During his term in office, he raised the price of petroleum twice. The people of Iran were furious with Mansour’s actions, especially since they were still coping with the inflation brought about by Allam’s so-called “slipshod” Administration. Although the international spot price of oil remained relatively constant, Iranian domestic oil prices continued to increase under the Mansour Administration. The public grew increasingly furious.

The stage was slowly being set for revolution. Public sentiment was boiling over with negativity directed at the Shah’s regime and more individuals were speaking out and sharing their negativity with neighbors, friends and colleagues. The end of inflation and “hard times” seemed nowhere in sight and the populace found itself of the brink. Tension over the situation was causing fissures in the ancient civilization of Iran (see Persia at Wikipedia).

THE SIX PRINCIPLES: THEORY VS. PRACTICE

In time, the “Six Principles” of the Shah were not enforced by his administration and the populace began to believe the Shah had deceived them. The land that the peasants received from the landowners was rapidly being sold off to pay the loans they took out to begin farming the land. The bubble the Six Principles created was bursting. During the first year of the cooperative effort, the government stopped funding the peasants and they had no chance of paying back their loans unless they were extremely fortunate with their first harvest. There was no subsidy to save their land or a Make Home Affordable refinancing program. Without a ‘bumper crop’ and/or favorable commodities prices at which they could liquidate their agricultural products, the lack of government subsidy follow-throughs caused the eviction of many off the land that had been transferred to them just a year earlier. These vagabond peasants were forced to migrate to the cities where they could find jobs to support themselves and their families.

HOVEIDA AS PRIME MINISTER

Mansour was assassinated by a secret organization belonging to the clerics in February, 1964 and Hoveida, who was the Financial Minister in Mansour’s administration, became the new Prime Minister in January of 1965 and served in that position until his arrest following the Iranian Revolution of 1978 and ultimate execution on April 7, 1979. Hoveida’s first decision in office was to decrease the price of oil to domestic buyers. This was significant in that it was perceived by the public as a goodwill gesture and eased tense public relations between them and the Iranian government.

Hoveida’s political platform seemed honest and open to them. He criticized the way the previous government had mishandled its affairs, and accepted the shortcomings of his own role as financial minister under Mansour. He announced a new governmental policy was being formulated and his constituency was eager to believe his optimistic outlook for Iran was sincere. Hoveida’s dreams of effortless prosperity were short-lived however. In 1963, he had taxed the wealthy heavily for the property they already owned and luxury items they bought. During the next 14 years, Hoveida imposed 250 different kinds of taxes in addition to those the citizens were already paying under Mansour. For example, if an individual, group or family wanted to travel outside of Iran by air, the principal traveler had to pay a two hundred dollar travel tax in addition to the respective airfare charge(s). Subsequently, a one hundred and fifty dollar surcharge was imposed and collected for each additional passenger on the flight as well. This policy, as could be expected, infuriated the rich, but appeased the poor whom the Shah was most anxious to please—they rarely if ever flew.

 

GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF IMPORTED AND EXPORTED ITEMS

All important imports and exports were governmentally controlled under Hoveida’s Prime Ministry. The most important commodities traded in Iran were grain, sugar, oil and industrially manufactured items. The services the government controlled were the railroads, postal service and airlines. Managers of the various smaller divisions of commerce were bribed on a regular basis while others simply embezzled surplus money using accounting principles and methodologies enabling them to “skim off the top” of the accounts without anyone being the wiser (See also #slushfunds). The government was unable to supervise all the subsidiary commerce division heads and graft soon became prevalent. Division managers enriched themselves often without being called to account for their actions to the public’s detriment.

For example, if an individual asked for permission to build a house, the housing office might say, “No, not unless you pay me this extra fee (as a bribe). During the rampant corruption of the division managers, one “minister” was found to have embezzled four million U.S. Dollars from an undisclosed sugar contract. When questioned by reporters about the embezzlement, Prime Minister Hoveida said that governmental officials “deserved” the added monetary job perks due to the important vital nature of the work they accomplished for the Iranian people.

IRAN AS A MEMBER OF OIL PRODUCING EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

In an act of goodwill toward his people, the Shah had dissolved the foreign concessionaires in Iran and nationalized oil resources circa 1963. The oil companies could sell and distribute the oil, but the petroleum products themselves were declared a public trust by him.
The result of the Shah’s nationalization of Iran’s oil meant both increased revenues and greater political leverage within the OPEC cartel, of which they had by this time become members.

THE SHAH’S DOMESTIC POLICIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS COMPARED

International investor was the Shah, and he placed large sums of money in foreign sources to assure him of assets were he to be thrown out of his home country as he had been in the early 1950’s during his confrontation with Dr. Mossadeq.
The Shah bought shares of foreign stock. Among his holdings was a 25% ownership in a German-based corporation named CROUP, and a relatively large position in Pan-American Airways. The Shah also built oil refineries in Africa, India, Pakistan and gave financial aid to the United Arab Republic, Great Britain, Pakistan and several African countries. In 1976, the economy of Great Britain was sagging and in dire need of economic stimulation. The Shah’s immediate investment and the currency float between Iran and the U.K. spelled increased British employment and a shot in the arm economically.

The domestic policy of the Shah was far different than his open-handed foreign policy. In the scholastic year of 1973-1974, the Shah allotted $1,500,000.00 per day to feed all students under sixteen years old, and gave $100.00 per month to each university student. In the elementary and high school programs for students under sixteen, the money for the food was sent in large quantities to the several different supervisors in the various districts of Iran. The supervisors in charge of distributing the lunch money for each child often found ways to withhold some of the money earmarked for the students. The district supervisors allowed skimpier lunches as time progressed and in doing so, were able to divert the more and more surplus money to themselves as an unsanctioned “reward” for their thrift and ingenuity. Sadly, the “unused” portion of the lunch money often surpassed the amount used to buy the student lunches and feed the children.

Of the 150,000 students in Iranian Universities some year in this period, 80,000 students were “foreigners”. Iranian students of age received one hundred dollars a month from the Pahlavi regime while “foreign students” received a four-hundred dollars a month allowance if they were sympathetic and receptive with the Shah’s regime (See foreign student subsidies). These gross imbalances in the student funding program did not content, but rather infuriated the public, especially parents of those participating in Iran’s education sector. Apparently, the foreign students were subsidized by the Iranian government and advanced funds before they were used in aid of its own people (this I suppose, angered the remainder of the population who weren’t involved in Iranian Public Education).

Of the utmost concern to the general public was lower prices on food; but it seemed Shah Pahlavi wanted a top down and lateral approach to “educating” its youth. The lateral being the “foreign students” used to fortify the Iranian Public Education at the expense of the “treasury”, whatever amorphous methodology or vehicle that treasury may have been housed in [due to lack of hard facts, editorial discretion utilized in last two paragraphs]. Food prices had been rising steadily since the Shah’s reintroduction to power in 1958, and the people became discouraged; beginning to think Shah Pahlavi was depriving them of their birthright. In retrospect, if the Shah had known beforehand the financing of the educational sector would break down and embezzling would occur, he might have used the student allowance money differently, to fight inflation, for instance. However, his advisors, like him, were out for their own gains but did not share the Shah’s altruistic sentiments toward the underprivileged classes. Since they were not the Shah, they may have felt underprivileged in a sense. A “me-first” mentality prevailed during this difficult time. At the turn of the twenty-first century in the United States, the sentiment was expressed as “I got mine, screw you.”

Embezzling fever spread all the way to the top of the political arena in Iran. One classic example of the government’s misuse of funds was discovered when a large sum of money was deposited in a Swiss bank under the name of Iran’s Federal Police Chief. As an alibi, the Chief said that he sent the money to the bank in his name so that no one would suspect it was Shah Pahlavi’s money. The Police Chief claimed he had every intention of giving the money back to the Shah when it was prudent to do so. It could be assumed Pahlavi was under extreme scrutiny and criticism of the free press at the time. The Shah accepted the Chief’s alibi, and kept the money for himself. People continued to demand lower food prices while concurrently, economists recommended to the Shah that he lower the price of gasoline instead of funding educational nutrition and foreign aid. The savings from cutting the educational subsidies would cover a wide range of goods and services in Iran. It would ease overall inflation, increase employment and raise the Iranian standard of living. For whatever reason, the Shah did not follow the advice of the economists and continued his education financing and nutrition program. As one might expect, civil unrest spread and the rally cry was “the government is ‘the Shah’—the economics are ‘the Shah’s'”.

POLITICS OF DEMOCRACY IN IRAN

The Shah was interested in Iran being seen as a modern democracy and demanded citizens have respect for the Constitution. There were three primary political parties in Iran. The leaders of each party were pre-selected by the Pahlavi family and were usually either relatives or close trusted friends. The three parties under the Shah’s regime were: 1) the Iran-Nowin Party, which was Prime Minister Hoveida’s party and had the majority in Parliament, 2) the Mardom Party, and 3) the Pan-Iranist Party. The parties were structured in a way that benefitted the Shah’s regime. Individuals the Shah and his council trusted were appointed as leaders of a particular party. In the three-party system, the Shah felt he could manipulate control of the government through “divide and conquer” tactics. The citizens of Iran knew the three-party system in Iran was “fixed” and many declined to vote or participate in Iranian democracy. As a result, the Shah’s secret police, SAVOK, forced people to vote or face the consequences of incarceration or worse. Despite the Shah’s intense scrutiny of his constituency and the terror tactics employed by his police force, if the requisite number of votes were not sufficient to elect a certain individual, SAVOK would see to it ballot boxes were stuffed with the name of the desired candidate.

SAVOK’S REVERSE-PSYCHOLOGY

In 1962, SAVOK ordered the less important members of Parliament to criticize the minor aspects of the Shah’s regime. The theory behind this policy was to get citizens more involved in politics and try to seek constructive rather than destructive changes. SAVOK’s plan backfired and “little criticisms” began to irritate and snow-ball into gigantic ones.

Underground coalitions distributed pamphlets criticizing the government, saying such things as “Even the government itself knows it is corrupted.” Propaganda tracts sent anonymously to houses and apartments aroused public interest in Iranian political corruption and mismanagement.

PRIME MINISTER HOVEIDA AND BALUCHESTAN

Baluchestan was in the far north-east corner of Iran and out of Hoveida’s “jurisdiction”. Hoveida referred the outlying region to the Shah. Relations between the central government and the public in Baluchestan were strained because of he had a “deaf ear” to their requests. When asked in Parliament why the people of Northern Iran were not allowed to fish, Hoveida replied “I am not your prime minister. Under the dictates of my appointment by the Shah, I have no jurisdiction in the matter. If you have any questions pertaining to that problem, you will have to address them to the Shah personally.”

Baluchestan, a city near the Pakistan-Iran border, ran out of water one summer because Afganistan, at the request of Soviet Russia, dammed the Hirmand, widely considered an ancient holy river. The farmers of the North-East region of Iran were forced to emmigrate to another province where there was sufficient water for their crops and/or livestock. The Hirmand was to Iran much like the Ganges is to India. The new Afgani dam was built in their own sovereign territory but upriver from the Iranian border and increased Afgani capacity to generate hydro-electric power and store water for their people(s).

One of the two members representing Baluchestan in the Iranian Parliament spoke at an assembly meeting asking Prime Minister Hoveida for the necessary funds to help villagers in his region to dig water wells in the North-East to enable them survive the summer drought. As it was, farmers in North-East Iran were evacuating to provinces that had water for their crops and livestock. The population of Baluchestan dwindled to approximately 900,000 people during this event due to lack of proper land management and public works. Hoveida remained indifferent to the plight of the North-Eastern farmers and their legal representatives. Baluchestan was geographically distant from the prosperous capitol of Tehran, which made it convenient for the prime minister to ignore them. Hoveida thought he could get by with the flattery he espoused in the capitol of Tehran by saying such things as, “The Shah takes care of his people”. It was inconceivable to the prime minister that the farmers were in the desperate conditions they claimed to be in. When Hoveida refuted the honesty of the representative from Baluchestan, he exacerbated the strife which already existed between the federal government and those empathizing with the Baluchestanis, but Hoveida made his position crystal clear: no aid of any kind would be sent to the North-East region of Iran.

The general public later found out Hoveida was the dishonest one. He had not done his due diligence on the region or he was simply lying. As soon as refugees from Baluchestan migrated to Tehran, they told their stories of hardship to those living in the capitol. Tehranians wondered if they were next to be “thrown under the bus.”

THE SHAH’S DIFFICULTY REGARDING THE CONTAINMENT OF PUBLIC UNREST; SAVOK CRACKDOWN circa 1975

The people of Iran felt that the representatives of the several parties should convene to discuss and perhaps litigate the country’s myriad problems. The Shah felt such a meeting would be counter-productive and weaken the morale of Iran. It would take aim at the countries deficiencies while leaving out the tremendous benefits his regime had introduced to the nation through industrialization. As a result, the Shah denied his people the representatives forum and instead, instituted a one-party political system which all Iranians had to join. This, the Shah hoped, would quell controversy by putting an end to factions hell-bent on victory for their allegiances.

It was the “allegiances” that were becoming a problem. Ministers could see the structure of the Iranian government was top-heavy. Whoever held the supreme office in the country had a ticket to riches beyond belief, or so some believed. The Shah surmised factions were actually beginning to ally against him as they had against Dr. Mossedeq during his term of office. The Shah proclaimed membership in the Rastahitz Party was mandatory. No dissenters, abstainers or other parties would be tolerated. Join Rastahitz or leave the country in disgrace was the implication of the Shah’s daring shift to one party rule.

In one instance, an engineer refused to become a member of the party and instead of being exiled as most dissenters had been, the government sent him to an asylum to be tortured and beaten. The courage and steadfastness of the engineer drew nationwide attention and SAVOK was put on alert to quash anti-Rastahitz rebels. SAVOK used this period of suppression to consolidate their power and learn about the workings of their people who they were assigned to watch. SAVOK brazenly wanted people to know how they would deal with dissenters and non-conformists. No longer afraid of the public, SAVOK all but boasted about their power to incarcerate and torture if necessary to achieve the Shah’s ends of a peaceful, prosperous and educated Iran. Dissenters would be singled out and beaten at will.

The Shah declared the Rastahitz Party would have three principles:

• The belief in an Imperial Regime with allegiance to the Shah
  
• Respect of the Iranian Constitution
  
• A strict belief and enforcement of the Shah’s “Six Principles” (see pp 8-11 above)
  

In the course of the next two years, the Shah asserted almost absolute control of the Rastahitz Party. Even though Hoveida was supposed to lead Party as acting prime minister, it was evident he did little to oppose the Shah and keep his power in check despite the Party’s principle to “respect of the Constitution.” In the summer of 1977, after two years in this state of affairs, the people grew increasingly restless and discontent with the tactics of their government. The Shah sensed it was time for a leadership change within the Rastahitz Party. Jamshid Amouzegar, who had been interior and finance minister in Hoveida’s cabinet and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Iran’s OPEC delegation, was selected as the Rastahitz candidate to follow Hoveida who had been prime minister for the preceding fourteen years.

Political life was not over for Hoveida however. As soon as he left office, he became the chief minister of justice. The chief minister of justice coordinated negotiations between the Shah and his cabinet. The new position, somewhat like a “Chief of Staff” in the United States, suited Hoveida. Coming off fourteen years of criticism for not listening to the public’s needs, he welcomed not having to dodge their complaints in public. As chief minister of justice, Hoveida could enjoy moving closer to the Shah’s “inner circle” and further away from public scrutiny.

Hoveida set out to transform the office as soon as his predecessor, Assadollah Allam vacated the post. Hoveida’s power was not diminished by his “demotion” from prime minister to chief minister of justice. As chief minister of justice, he was able to rub elbows with the other ministers, glean information and maintain his clout. During negotiations between the Shah and his ministers for instance, Hoveida was often a useful mediator and the Shah’s go-to man to get deals done. Although he had to share power, Hoveida was certainly a major figurehead of the Iranian government during Amouzegar’s Administration [August 7, 1977-August 27, 1978].

AMOUZEGAR AS PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN [August 7, 1977-August 27, 1978]

In 1977, Amouzegar (also known as Amougazar) raised the price of governmentally controlled items such as petroleum. The increase in fixed prices for nationalized products riled the public, which had been growing increasingly discontent with the Shah’s regime [this writer did not ask the source about specific incidents or details of the public’s response to the government influenced inflation rates during this period]. The people in Iran wanted to change the party system and began to incite passionate demonstrations in order to accuse the government of the injustice of economic hardships (perhaps boiling over from prior events under Hoveida). In response to the demonstrations, the Shah’s Rastahitz party was forced to protect itself through the use of surveillance and SAVOK police enforcement. The Shah used the Rastahitz Party as a tool to keep peoples thoughts and actions within the confines of one political ideology—his own. The Shah was able to establish and retain the one-party system in Iran through the use of his secret police, who continued to use totalitarian tactics against its own citizens.

SAVOK used brutal forms of psychological conditioning upon individuals (including its own members) to maintain authoritative control over them. This system was a “fatherhood”, Highlander top-down system as Adolf Hitler employed in Third Reich Germany. The regimes and citizens of the two countries, Iran and Germany, are not being compared here by the ghostwriter/editor as much as the “bones” of the political structure. Execution, exile and imprisonment not only petrified the public from acting against the regime, but it prevented the potential reactionaries from arousing widespread, outright contempt of the monarchy (see Amouzegar’s uniform on #Wikipediaonline). Without leaders to coordinate a counter-offensive force against the Iranian government, citizens opposed to the Shah became sitting ducks for a SAVOK attack. The Shah’s primary fear was that the public’s discontent and hatred would be unleashed upon the regime with the momentum to polish it off. As the years of Shah Pahlavi’s reign passed, the fabric holding it together frayed. The Shah became desperate, fearing thin fabric of his government would rip apart. He began to rely on SAVOK as the sole cohesive force to maintain law and a semblance of “temporary order”. From the public’s point of view, an unsettled social environment and sporadic, chronic civil unrest continued. As a result of the ever-increasing social unrest, the Shah became a nervous wreck. The thread-like tentacles of SAVOK’s organization began to lose their grip on the civilian masses and more and more individuals set their faces against the Shah. A unified, consolidated opposition had not entered the consciousness of the general public as of yet, but various alternative forms of government were being explored and openly discussed despite SAVOK.

KHOMEINI BECOMES AN AYATOLLAH FOR PURPOSES OF DIPLOMACY AND SELF-PROTECTION

In 1965, Great Ayatollah Shariatmadari invited six religious leaders to elect Khomeini a top religious position, making him insusceptible to execution under the law. The position Khomeini was granted was that of a “Great Ayatollah” (translated as “Word of God”) or “Imam” (one of an oligarchical council of Islamic leaders, similar to the figurehead of the Papacy in the Roman Catholic Church). In Iran, it is law that the Ayatollah proclaims the word of God and is therefore immune to any governmental intervention that is a threat to his bodily person. Once regarded as an Imam, Khomeini’s fear of execution would vanish.

KHOMEINI’S ROLE IN THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1978

In 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini used his physical distance from Iran during his exile in Iraq to enable sharp criticism directed against the Shah’s regime. The attention of the Iranian people quickly focused on Khomeini’s speeches as he was the only Iranian leader familiar enough with Iranian politics and religion to speak openly about the Shah’s regime. Before his exile, Khomeini could not speak out against the Shah and draw crowds due to SAVOK’s jurisdiction over him at that time.

Without SAVOK breathing down his neck (and perhaps with the aid of Shiet supporters in Iraq), Khomeini’s following grew. He denounced the Shah on a regular basis and the crowds were enthralled as they listened. Now here was a #leader. They were looking for “reform” and a new father, and Khomeini fit the bill in 1978. Before Khomeini arrived on the scene and became popular, most had wanted to follow the political leaders who were already well known. The Shah suppressed their voices, so the Ayatollah Khomeini’s voice by comparison rang clear over the air waves in print and by word of mouth. His words played to their heartstrings the songs of religion their souls longed to hear. They were tired of empty speeches that led to dead-end reforms—they wanted action and to get one over on the Shah’s secret police force SAVOK.

Khomeini’s political, social and religious platform became ever more popular among the people of Iran because his proposals became the will of the people: most wanted the Shah and his regime ousted. Khomeini promised the “uprooting and removal of the evil tree” that was growing stronger, sapping the strength of the Iranian people and providing no meaningful fruit to the people. The Shah, Khomeini would proclaim contemptuously, took more goods than he gave back. The Shah was a one-way ticket to a disintegrated, demoralized Iran. The people wanted the Iranian economic tree to flourish and they were optimistic Khomeini’s resilience and Islamic-focused doctrine could take them to prosperity. After removal of the “evil tree”, Khomeini believed he would become fertilizer for a petro-plenty tree to be shared by all in Iran. Khomeini’s movement toward counter-dictatorship was increasing in momentum like a huge boulder rolling down a hill destined to crush Shah Pahlavi at the bottom of its trajectory. The bulk of Khomeini’s support came from peasants, lower class city-dwellers and illiterate religious disciples of the Islamic clergymen. The illiterates were subservient to the cleric’s will and did not question their methods, credibility or authority. They had limited capacity to discern what was happening around them and relied on the clergymen to be their “eyes”. The power of the Ayatollahs was centralized in the mosques and that is where they organized masses of peasants against the Shah. The mosques imbued a sense of sanctuary even SAVOK might not breach. Khomeini became the archetypal savior and the Shah his evil counterpart. [Compare parables of the good and evil trees from the Bible, as well as “fertilizer for the new tree” versus the Christian “holy communion” “I am the vine, you are the branches.”].

The Iranian National Front and the Toudeh Party

Two other fronts were staking out positions against the Shah’s Rastahitz Party: The Iranian National Front or INF and the Toudeh or Communist Party. The INF was more moderate and business-oriented than either the clergymen or the Rastahitz Party. It was comprised mostly of merchants, middle-class citizens and students. Its leaders were the colleagues of the former Prime Minister Mossadeq, who by 1978 was deceased. These colleagues carried on the traditions of the party in secret since the Shah had placed a moratorium on freedom to associate in a political party other than the Rastahitz Party.

Another movement opposed to the Shah’s regime was the communist party (Toudeh), whose members were primarily students, workers and educated people dissatisfied with the Shah, democracy and capitalism in general. The base of the Toudeh Party was located at Tehran Technical University (hereinafter referred to as TTU]. All three movements, the clergy, the INF and the Toudeh Party worked from different vantage points (loci) against the Shah: the clergy with Khomeini’s followers at the mosques, the INF in secret and the Toudeh Party from the universities. SAVOK could not be everywhere at once.

The Toudeh Party’s centralization at TTU gave them immediate recognition and widespread notoriety in the public eye. So much was their popularity among the people from that location that the government thought it necessary to transfer TTU out of Tehran and into the suburbs of Esphahan, Iran. The move would disrupt the triad aligned against the Shah and the lines of communication among TTU faculty, students and administrators.

The Shah and his cabinet made the claim that the move was not essentially political in nature but would enable the universities to be closer to the metal smelting factory near Esphehan. The closer proximity of the smelter to TTU had several advantages but the timing was not lost on the Toudeh Party. During pre-arranged demonstrations, the communist speakers used the university relocation as political ammunition and blasted the Shah. University students and faculty resisted the move even before the demonstrations began and now they had communist mouthpieces going to bat for them. As a result, the faculty and students sensed a “solidarity” and empowerment. The TTU relocation was another example of the Shah’s program of bullying. For his part, the Shah had dissenting university faculty “laid off” for their disregard of his decision to relocate TTU. Laid off professors gained the support of factions who felt the relocation to be another underhanded scheme of the Shah’s. One of these factions was the merchants of Iran. The merchant faction wanted the university professors who were laid off paid their forfeited salaries. Merchants offered the professors money to recompense them for their lost jobs. In a show of unity and self-respect, the professors did not accept the merchants’ offer of money but rather opened a bank account and distributed information about the account, including the account number, and asked that all teachers and educators in the country donate whatever they could to the account. Their colleagues responded generously to the request and the unemployed professors limited themselves to only half of their former salaries although the donations far exceeded the capacity to pay them a full paycheck.

The restraint of the professors in utilizing the charitable trust (not used necessarily here as a legal term of art) account was designed to demonstrate suffering and self-sacrifice. They wanted to show the attentive and anxious people of the country that the time to revolt was at hand. Their restraint of material livelihood came down to a quiet impression of a collective fast. The fast concomitant with the sacrificial and suffering had a bout [end (Fr.)], a deepening cause and determination to overthrow the Shah. Removing the present regime in Iran meant single-minded thinking of the people was in order, just like the communists, the merchants and now the teachers were telling them. They desired to come together to protest the mishandling of the government and its current leaders in the Rastahitz Party. In order to make the daily demonstration more effective, the professors asked for everyone to live a more frugal existence in order to strengthen solidarity against the Shah’s regime.

A NEW BOARD OF DIRECTORS APPOINTED IN RASTAHITZ PARTY–1977

Many of the lawyers working for the revolution wanted to re-elect a new board of directors because they were dissatisfied with its present “pro-Shah” constituents. The Chairman of the Board was a close friend of the Shah’s. The lawyers were unhappy with this man representing them and they fought for someone else who would represent their interests more succinctly. The lawyers finally succeeded in getting a new board of directors and with it, much of the Shah’s clout among the eschelons of lawyers disappeared. All the new members of the council were persons who had previously fought against the Shah and had not changed their view of him much if at all. The transition made a transformative change in the psyche of the population of Iran and more particularly, the Rastahitz Party. It was a significant blow to the strength of his regime.

The new Board acted as the liaison between the citizens of Iran and its government officials. They defended the constitution and the moral rights of citizens and prisoners of the country by working on various reform programs in the penitentiaries. It sent people to investigate SAVOK’s treatment of prisoners and those that had been released from incarceration to tell their stories. The findings of the investigators revealed that the prisoners had been tortured by the secret police illegally while under arrest for political crimes. The Board defended the prisoners and “ex-cons” while prosecuting SAVOK and its coercive tactics beyond the pall.

SAVOK ON THE “WHIPPING POST”

Judicial proceedings were instituted wherein the Board would represent the mistreated prisoners pro bono (for the public good without a fee) and news of the proceedings helped to incriminate the illegal and inhumane activities of SAVOK.

SAVOK was the main cause of the Shah’s problems from which all others followed like his own shadow. The shadow seemed (“mother I know not seems“,
Hamlet from Hamlet) to follow the Shah as a reminder of the self-perceived horror that his people did not love, respect nor obey him. SAVOK was the major cause of the peoples dislike for the Shah. The Shah used SAVOK to achieve his own ends in keeping his grip of control over the country. SAVOK began to conduct themselves atrociously in beatings and threats as far as the end justified the means. The coercive tactics were left to the discretion of the police without proper review, checks or balances. The police were allowed to use a subjective view of “reasonable force” when interrogating, executing or incarcerating their arrestees. Perhaps it was the Shah’s distrust in his countrymen and women which forced his hand on brutal methods if he wanted to maintain his position in Iranian society. The more force and violence SAVOK used to suppress dissidents after the new Board had ruled, the stronger the retaliation by the public against SAVOK and other elements of oppression in the Shah’s regime. In fact, the people began to think of SAVOK and Shah Pavlavi as one, although the two were not one. SAVOK, one of the strongest, most expansive and expensive organizations at the time and the Shah did not communicate well with each other under the intense scrutiny of the Board. The Shah’s lack of a peculiar coordination with SAVOK which would be necessary for such a government to prevail intact was woefully lacking, at least as far as the Board was concerned. Not only the lawyers, but the prisoners, ex-cons, the collective will of an entire nation was determined to oust the dictator. Thus, it was not only the Shah’s inability to adequately control his subjects that bought on his exile from Iran in 1978 but also the weapon he had used as a means to achieve his vision for the Iranian people, SAVOK, proved a rather blind albeit not objective ally in law enforcement under their jurisdictions

SAVOK’S RETALIATION AGAINST AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI

In the months immediately preceding Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran from Iraq in 1978, SAVOK was busy devising a scheme to degrade his reputation. SAVOK printed an article in the daily newspapers alleging that Khomeini was not a descendant of Mohammed, the prophet, but rather, the descendant of an untouchable from India. SAVOK claimed Khomeini’s brother, who was born in India, carried the name Hendizandh. “Hendizandh” was a name given to his brother because SAVOK alleged that Khomeini’s grandfather was an untouchable.

Citizenship in Kaom, Iran’s holy city, were aggravated with SAVOK’s accusations. It didn’t take long before the aggravation of the masses was turned to anger. The clergy led a rally in support of the Ayatollah against the government’s subversive activities contrary to Islamic doctrines. A police force was called in to confront demonstrators at the rally and at some point opened fire on the demonstrators. Some of the crowd fled to the nearby home of Great Ayatollah Dari for asylum or “sanctuary”. The Shah’s police followed the rabble into the house, killed a clergyman and wounded others present.

The aftermath of the affair left the government much to explain to its people…and the Board. Because Great Ayatollah Dari was a very popular figure in Iran, it was difficult for Savok to justify the event without some degree of taint due to the death in the Dari compound. High ranking officials in the Shah’s government representing him apologized for the unfortunate occurrence. The argument of the Shah’s lawyers and representatives was that the police that stormed the Dari compound were not local police and did not know the home they entered was that of Great Ayatollah Shariatmadari. If the police were locals, they would have known the house belonged to Dari and would not have followed the rabble in hot pursuit and would not have attacked anyone there.

SHARIATMADARI [DARI]

Shariatma Dari is from the Osaboyjam province, the capitol of which is Tabriz. On August 11, 1978, the people of Tabriz, in empathy for the martyred of Koam, demonstrated in the suburb of Istafan. More than 100,000 people were involved in the demonstration, making it large enough to shake the government’s confidence in itself. The demonstration was so successful that it began to tip the scales of domination away from the government and toward the anti-Shah movement of the clergymen (compare “Movement of Jah People” by Bob Marley and the Wailers). The people felt that the Shah was even taking their privacy and freedom of religion away from them.

In hopes of quick-quick stabilization of the civil unrest in Iran, SAVOK brought 200,000 peasants of their own from all over the country to show
the still remaining wide-spread hearty support for the Shah.

STUDENTS ARE QUICKER THAN OLD MEN: STUDENTS ACT AGAINST THE SHAH’S DICTATORSHIP

On September 7, 1978, students joined together to protest the Shah’s move to send university professors to Isfahan, a city 300 miles south of Tehran. As soon as school resumed in September, the students became active in the socio-political affairs of Iran. They often argued with the government on ways to support the former professors of TTU. This topic was only a ploy used by the students in an attempt to weaken the political fabric of the country and shake regime confidence: the fighting and hysteria had already begun unbeknownst to “anyone over 30”. Whenever students demonstrated in the streets, the Shah’s anti-riot squads attacked the crowds and beat them with clubs. The brutal activity angered the students and fighting broke out often between the two factions. The students continued to riot successively day after day, breaking windows of government banks and office buildings. The people looked at each violent event as one step closer to their liberty and freedom.

                Two Years Earlier

In 1976, the government approved a bill that would raise the price of oil in Iran by sixteen cents a gallon annually. The Iranian National Front and the clergymen invoked the populace to protest the bill. The design for the protest was devised by boycotting oil for one day. [Edward James Olmos invited me to such a demonstration of solidarity in Los Angeles, but I was going nowhere fast back then as an extra. Later in the day he asked me “Are you an extra?” “Yes I responded at the construction site.” He had Tony Plana, the director, who I recently worked with as an extra on a tv movie where he played the Arizona prosecutor (Jose) leading to the conviction of Jodie Arias, remove me from the set to sit in the back seat of an automobile. Later in the day I saw Olmos driving a new red Ferrari. Got the feeling he bought or rented it with the pay from the film. What’s the saying? Someone’s got to enjoy this world. “It’s A Wonderful World” Louis Armstrong.] The clergy asked people not to work or drive their cars for one full day to show the government they could do without gasoline for one day. Most people in Iran were still afraid to miss work because of the consequential retribution delivered care of SAVOK. Traffic in Tehran the day of the moratorium was less than usual, but not so scant as to attract significant attention to the boycott. Because of the stress the clergy and the INF had placed on the importance of the boycott, the Shah believed his worries were over when the protest “failed.”

The clergymen of Quom demanded that the Shah permit the Ayatollah Khomeini to return peacefully to Iran. The people, led by the clergy, demonstrated to make their position clear to the Shah and his “regimsters” (sic). After being provoked by the demonstrators to violence, the police tried to intervene, and rioting broke out. The police tried to disperse the crowd with machine gun fire before the rioting got out of control. People of all Iranian provinces mourned for the dead after the unrest and brought up fresh protests against the Shah’s brutal regime.

 

 

[to be edited and continued in Installment 25]

Personal Analysis: the next several decades will show continued issues pertaining to dislocation and people being trapped without self-sufficient resources. My personal horror is being caught standing in a long line to buy a manufactured burger in the direct sunlight of oppressive heat without water or a friend.

 

Copyright ‘M’ As told to John Rubens (July 7, 1980, 1981);

Compilation Copyright ‘M’, John Rubens (1980; 1981, online 2014); Titles by John Matthew Rubens); [recent former titles: The Iranian Revolution 1978—Islamic Fatherhood Questioned?; The Iranian Revolution 1978: Islamic Fatherland Questioned?(2014)].

Formerly entitled, The Iranian Revolution: Iran’s Struggle with a New Father, Copyright M, as told to and edited by John Rubens (1980, 1981) Title by M.

 

Research notes to be incorporated or edited later

According to Jan Michiel Otto, Professor of Law and Governance in Developing Countries at Leiden University, “Anthropological research shows that people in local communities often do not distinguish clearly whether and to what extent their norms and practices are based on local tradition, tribal custom, or religion. Those who adhere to a confrontational view of sharia tend to ascribe many undesirable practices to sharia and religion overlooking custom and culture, even if high-ranking religious authorities have stated the opposite.” Otto’s analysis appears in a paper commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^{[73] [From Wikipedia online 05-13-2014 under search “Sharia law definition”]}

 

[May 5, 2014: Cinco De Mayo Los Angeles: Correction: Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani. {Re: following tweet from Ayatollah Khamenei received by retweet (RT) via Margaret Brennan of #BloombergNews today: “Around 1979 during Friday prayers,I talked about Irish #freedom fighters & #BobbySands that a street in #Iran bears his name.” From Khamenei’s official #twitterpage: “Follow for regular updates and news about Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader.” Thank you for the corrections.}]

[O4-29-2014: Tweet received from President Hassan Rouhani : “Today, the world is witness to how we are engaging with the international community with a voice of reason. #ConstructiveEngagement.” Back to the Future (1985) A Film by Robert Zemeckis, starring Christopher Lloyd and Michael J. Fox #UniversalPictures].

[See also: Accounts by Principal for Occidental Petroleum from Wikipedia: Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) is a California-based oil and gas exploration and production company with operations in the United States, the Middle East, North Africa, and South America. Its headquarters is in Westwood, Los Angeles California^[4][5] but the company has announced it will move to Houston in 2014 or 2015.^{[6] online 2014]}

[The Iran–Contra affair [#IranContra] (Persian: ایران–کنترا‎, Spanish: caso Irán-Contra), also referred to as Irangate,^[1]
Contragate^[2] or the Iran–Contra scandal, was a political scandal in the United States that came to light in November 1986. During the Reagan administration, senior administration officials secretly facilitated the sale of arms to Iran, the subject of an arms embargo.^[3] Some U.S. officials also hoped that the arms sales would secure the release of several hostages and allow U.S. intelligence agencies to fund the Nicaraguan
Contras. Under the Boland Amendment, further funding of the Contras by the government had been prohibited by Congress.

The scandal began as an operation to free the seven American hostages being held in Lebanon by a group with Iranian ties connected to the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. It was planned that Israel would ship weapons to Iran, and then the United States would resupply Israel and receive the Israeli payment. The Iranian recipients promised to do everything in their power to achieve the release of the U.S. hostages. The plan deteriorated into an arms-for-hostages scheme, in which members of the executive branch sold weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of the American hostages.^[4][5] Large modifications to the plan were devised by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council in late 1985, in which a portion of the proceeds from the weapon sales was diverted to fund anti-Sandinista and anti-communist rebels, or Contras, in Nicaragua.^[6][7]

While President Ronald Reagan was a supporter of the Contra cause,^[8] the evidence is disputed as to whether he authorized the diversion of the money raised by the Iranian arms sales to the Contras.^[4][5][9] Handwritten notes taken by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on December 7, 1985, indicate that Reagan was aware of potential hostage transfers with Iran, as well as the sale of Hawk and TOW missiles to “moderate elements” within that country.^[10] Weinberger wrote that Reagan said “he could answer to charges of illegality but couldn’t answer to the charge that ‘big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free the hostages'”.^[10] After the weapon sales were revealed in November 1986, Reagan appeared on national television and stated that the weapons transfers had indeed occurred, but that the United States did not trade arms for hostages.^[11] The investigation was impeded when large volumes of documents relating to the scandal were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan administration officials.^[12] On March 4, 1987, Reagan returned to the airwaves in a nationally televised address, taking full responsibility for any actions that he was unaware of, and admitting that “what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages”.^[13]

Several investigations ensued, including those by the U.S. Congress and the three-person, Reagan-appointed Tower Commission. Neither found any evidence that President Reagan himself knew of the extent of the multiple programs.^[4][5][9] Ultimately the sale of weapons to Iran was not deemed a criminal offense but charges were brought against five individuals for their support of the Contras. Those charges, however, were later dropped because the administration refused to declassify certain documents. The indicted conspirators faced various lesser charges instead. In the end, fourteen administration officials were indicted, including then-Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger. Eleven convictions resulted, some of which were vacated on appeal.^[14] The rest of those indicted or convicted were all pardoned in the final days of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, who had been vice-president at the time of the affair.^[15]]

[“Iran-Contra Affair” and “Shariatmadari” courtesy of and special thanks to Wikipedia online 05-02-2014; Wikipedia Sources. See also Michael M. J. Fischer. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003.

Moojan Momen Shi’i Islam Yale University Press 1986

Shaul Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, ISBN 0-465-06887-1

Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran]

#ResearchPause

Re:
A Spinning Top, Polarities and the Axis of Pull in International Relations & Domestic Finance

 

#RelationshipDiametrics #relationshipdiametrics

 

 

Current California Education Finance Documents and Nutrition Reimbursement Rates

From California Dept of Education website: See Telephone # below for more information.

I googled: education finance and nutrition and clicked on CA Dept of Education.

 

2014-15 CNP Reimbursement Rates

Child Nutrition Program meal program reimbursement rates.

Summer Food Service Program

Reimbursement Rates for
January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014

Total (Combined) Reimbursement

Includes operating and administrative components.

Questions:   Nutrition Services Division | 800-952-5609

Download Free Readers

CA Dept. of Education Website:

My tweet of paraphrase of description of its State and Federal mission:

The Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) is a CA and federally funded program that provides funding to care centers. See also
#sponsoredcare.